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A longstanding question in economics is why some countries are so much richer than 
others.  Today, for example, income per capita in the world’s richest countries is roughly 
thirty-five times greater than it is in the world’s poorest countries.  Recent work (e.g., 
Robert E. Lucas 2001, and Rachel Ngai 1999) argues that the proximate cause of this 
disparity is that today’s poor countries began the process of industrialization much later 
and that this process is slow.    
     In this paper we argue that a model of structural transformation provides a useful 
theory of both why industrialization occurs at different dates, and why it proceeds slowly. 
A key implication o f this model is that growth in agricultural productivity is central to 
development, a message that also appears prominently in the traditional development 
literature. (See, e.g., Peter Timmer (1986)). 
I.  A Model of Structural Transformation 
Our model builds on the works of John Laitner (1998) and Gary Hansen and Edward C. 
Prescott (forthcoming).
1  Its basic structure is that of the one-sector neoclassical growth 
model extended to include an explicit agricultural sector. In our model, development is 
associated with a structural transformation (i.e., a declining role for agriculture).  
Asymptotically, agriculture’s employment share shrinks to zero, and the model becomes 
identical to the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model.   
Preferences—There is an  infinitely-lived representative family endowed with a unit of 
time in each period.  Period utility is defined over a non-agricultural good ( ct) and an 
agricultural good ( at). To generate a structural transformation we assume a utility   2
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Lifetime utility is given by:  
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  It follows that once (per capita) output in the agricultural sector reaches  a, all 
remaining labor will flow out of agriculture regardless of the state of the non-agricultural 
sector. A more general treatment would allow for the state of the non-agricultural sector 
to impact the labor allocated to agriculture. This potentially important effect is explored 
in Douglas Gollin, Stephen Parente, and Richard Rogerson (2000). We abstract from it 
here so as to f ocus attention on how the state of the agricultural sector affects the labor 
available for the non-agricultural sector. 
 Technologies--The nonagricultural sector produces output ( Ymt) using capital ( Kmt) and 
labor (Nmt) as inputs: 
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In equation (3),  Am is a TFP parameter, and  gm is the constant exogenous rate of 
technological change. This production function is standard except for the term  aNmt. It is 
added to allow an economy with no physical  capital to accumulate capital. In the 
numerical work that follows we will pick  a to be a small number.    
  The parameter Am is assumed to be country-specific, being determined by policies and 
institutions that impact on activity in the non-agriculture sector. In contrast, the   3
parameters  gm and a are assumed to be identical across countries. Much of the stock of 
useful knowledge owes its creation to research and development in the rich countries.  
Since poor countries are generally not in the business of creating ideas, the assumption of 
exogenous technological change is reasonable from their perspective.  
  Output from the manufacturing sector can be used for consumption or investment 
(Xmt), and the law of motion for the economy’s stock of capital is 
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  The agricultural sector produces output ( Yat) using only labor ( Nat). Though we 
abstract from land as an input, adding land to the production function would have no 
impact on our results.  
  There are two available technologies for producing the agricultural good: a traditional 
technology and a modern technology. The key difference is that the modern agriculture 
technology is subject to exogenous technological change. Using the traditional 
technology, one unit of time produces  a units of the agricultural good.  There is nothing 
particularly special about this value, and our results would not be much affected if it were 
either somewhat higher or lower than a.
3  
The modern technology is given by: 
at
t
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In equation (5), Aa is a TFP parameter that is assumed to be country-specific, and ga is the 
rate of exogenous technological change in the modern agricultural technology, that is 
common across countries. Like the non-agricultural TFP parameter, the agricultural TFP 
parameter is affected by country policy and institutions. It is also affected by both climate 
and the quantity and quality of land per person. Technological innovations that are useful   4
for a specific crop in a given climate may not be particularly relevant for other crops in 
other parts of the world, thus generating large differences in cross-country productivity 
levels that are independent of policy.    
  Output from the agriculture sector can only be used for consumption so the 
agriculture resource constraint is simply at £ Yat.  
Solving the Model--We focus on the competitive equilibrium for this economy, and in 
particular on how different values of the TFP parameters  Aa and  Am affect the resulting 
dynamic allocations. Solving for the competitive equilibrium is straightforward, and 
involves two steps. The first step determines the labor allocation across sectors in each 
period.  Preferences imply that labor will be allocated entirely to the agricultural sector 
until  Aa(1+ga)
t ‡  a.  Once this equality is satisfied, agricultural production switches from 
the traditional technology to the modern t echnology, and labor flows out of agriculture at 
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  Given the time path of labor allocations, the second step solves for the optimal path 
for investment.  This is equivalent to solving the transitional dynamics of the neoclassical 
growth model with an exogenous time profile of labor input given by  Nmt. As technology 
in the agriculture sector increases at rate  ga,  Nat eventually approaches zero, and  Nmt 
approaches one. Asymptotically, therefore, the  model is identical to the standard one 
sector neoclassical growth model. 
II.   Numerical Experiments 
We begin by providing a benchmark specification that broadly captures the development 
of the United Kingdom over the last 250 years.  The length of a time period is set to one   5
year. Without loss of generality the values of  Am and  Aa are normalized to one. 
Asymptotically, the growth rate of (per capita) output in this economy is gm. Since Angus 
Maddison (1995) reports that the growth rate of per capita output in the United Kingdom 
has been around 1.3 percent per year over the last 100 years, we choose  gm=.013. 
Following Parente and Prescott (1994, 2000) the capital share parameter q is set to 0.50.  
We set d to 0.065 and a to 0.0001.   The parameters  a and ga are set so that the model 
matches UK agricultural employment shares in 1800 and 1950 of 35 percent and 5 
percent respectively (see Simon Kuznets (1966)).  We choose  b so that the asymptotic 
annual interest rate is 5 percent.   Given this calibration, the first year in which resources 
are moved out of agriculture in the United Kingdom is 1720.     
    Despite the model’s simplicity, it matches the UK development and growth 
experience over the last 250 years quite closely.  Figures 1 and 2 compare the time series 
generated by the model to UK data taken from Kuznets (1966) for agriculture’s 
employment share and output per capita relative to its 1820 level.   
  We now explore the implications of cross-country productivity differences for the 
evolution of cross-country income differences and economic structure.  As already 
mentioned, we use these productivity differences as a reduced form catchall to reflect 
cross-country differences along a number of dimensions, including taxation, regulation, 
assignment and enforcement of property rights, institutions such as collective bargaining, 
and soil and climate conditions. Recall that  Aa and  Am were normalized to one for the 
benchmark economy.  
  Figure 3 depicts the path of output relative to the benchmark f or economies that start 
to industrialize in 1750, 1850, and 1950, assuming  Am =1 for all economies. Relative   6
income for each economy is computed using year 2000 prices from the benchmark 
economy. A country that begins to industrialize in 1850 has  Aa =.19,  and an 1850 per 
capita income equal to 9.4 percent of the leader.  By 2000, agriculture’s share of 
employment declines from 100 percent to 15 percent.  In contrast, a country that begins 
to industrialize in 1950 has Aa =.05, a 1950 per capita income equal to 2.5 percent of the 
leader, and by 2000 agriculture’s share of employment declines to 50 percent.  These 
values are typical of the employment shares and relative incomes observed among the 
poorest countries in the world over the second half of the twentieth century.
4   From a 
quantitative perspective, this model supports the longstanding idea in the development 
literature that low agricultural productivity is a major reason that some countries are so 
poor. 
  Several interesting implications follow from Figure 3. First, it is misleading to 
interpret all cross-country differences in income in 2000 as steady-state differences.  This 
interpretation is taken by Parente, Rogerson, and Randall Wright (2000), Parente and 
Prescott (1994, 2000), and V.V. Chari, Patrick Kehoe, and Ellen McGrattan (1996), to 
name a few.   
Second, countries that start the development process later will exhibit faster growth 
than earlier developers.  This is consistent with the finding of Parente and Prescott 
(1994), that countries that f irst achieved a certain level of income (say, e.g. $2,000) later 
in history were able to double their income (to $4,000) in a far shorter period than 
countries that achieved this level of income earlier in history.     
  Third, the development process is a  slow process.  A country that begins to 
industrialize in 1950 will not be near its steady state relative output level until roughly   7
one hundred years later. This transition is much slower than what occurs in the one-sector 
neoclassical growth model starting with a small capital stock. The reason for this 
difference is that, in our model, labor moves only slowly into the non-agricultural sector. 
This matters a lot for the speed of convergence to the steady state.   
  Fourth, a distortion to agricultural activity actually leads to more resources being 
devoted to this activity.  This is in contrast to many models whereby if only one sector is 
distorted, agents substitute out of it. In our model agricultural output is necessary and 
hence the economy cannot substitute away from producing it.   
The results described above assumed  Am =1, implying that all income differences 
vanish asymptotically. As stressed earlier, many factors may contribute to cross-country 
variation in the value of  Am as well.  Though we do not provide details the basic results 
just described continue to hold if the industrializing countries also have lower values of 
Am. For instance, consider a country with  Am =.5, implying an asymptotic relative income 
of .25. If this country begins industrialization in 1950, then in 2000 its relative income is 
only about .15 and it is not until almost 2050 that it approaches its steady-state value. 
III Evidence 
Since the notion that improvements in agricultural productivity allow resources to be 
released to other activities is central to our results, it is important to assess the empirical 
support for this proposition.  In reality there is a large dispersion in both the levels and 
growth rates of agricultural productivities across countries. Here we ask whether t hese 
differences are consistent with the predictions of our model. 
We examined data for the 1960-1990 period for a set of 62 countries defined as 
developing by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, and   8
for which all relevant data were available. Two main findings support the mechanics of 
our model. First, in the cross section, there is a negative relationship between agricultural 
productivity and both GDP per capita and the share of employment in agriculture. This 
same relationship holds for the productivity of agriculture relative to non-agriculture. 
Second, in the panel data there is a positive relationship between the growth in a 
country’s agricultural productivity and the movement of labor out of agriculture. This 
relationship also holds if we consider the growth in food output per capita instead of 
agricultural productivity.   
The implication is that countries experiencing increases in agricultural productivity 
are able to release labor from agriculture into other sectors of  the economy. This is 
particularly important because the data also shows that in most poor countries, output per 
worker in non-agriculture is substantially higher than in agriculture. Hence, a shift of 
workers from agriculture to non-agriculture increases a verage productivity. For example, 
shifting a worker from agriculture to non-agriculture in 1960 would have tripled their 
output in Korea or Malaysia; it would have increased it by a factor of nine in Thailand. 
We also find that growth in agricultural productivity is quantitatively important in 
understanding the growth of GDP per worker for developing countries. To establish this 
result, we decomposed growth in per worker GDP over the 1960-1990 period into three 
components: growth within agriculture, growth  within non-agriculture, and growth due to 
sectoral shifts. Growth within agriculture (non-agriculture) is simply the growth in output 
per worker within agriculture (non-agriculture), weighted by agriculture’s (non-
agriculture’s) employment share in the initial period. The sectoral shift component is the 
residual. On average, the contribution of agricultural growth, non-agricultural growth,   9
and sectoral shifts are 54 percent, 17 percent and 29 percent respectively. From this 
decomposition, we conclude that a gricultural productivity growth, along with the ensuing 
sectoral shifts in employment, is an important source of economic growth for these 
countries.
5 
IV.  Conclusions 
We have shown in a simple model that low agricultural productivity can substantially 
delay industrialization. By delaying the onset of industrialization, poor agricultural 
technologies or policies result in a country’s per capita income falling far behind that of 
the leader. Improvements in agricultural productivity can hasten the start of 
industrialization, and hence have large effects on a country’s relative income.  Such 
changes will, in the short-run, have a larger impact than comparable increases in non-
agricultural productivity, even though in the long run it is productivity in the non-
agricultural sector that determines a country’s position relative to the leader. The key 
message that emerges from our analysis is that a greater understanding of the determinants 
of agricultural productivity will enhance our understanding of the development process for 
those nations that are currently poor.   10
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Figure 3: Relative Outputs 
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